Ten days after the United States and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury against Iran, the Strait of Hormuz remains the most consequential 33 kilometres of water in the world and the clearest measure of how far the conflict has progressed from a military campaign into a sustained disruption of the global economy. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps says it controls the strait completely. Commercial traffic data suggests they are not wrong.
What the IRGC Has Said and Done
Brigadier General Ebrahim Jabari, speaking on Iranian state television, delivered the threat in terms that required no interpretation: “The strait is closed, and whoever wants to cross — our heroes in the navy of the IRGC and army will set those ships on fire.”
On March 4, IRGC Navy official Mohammad Akbarzadeh went further, declaring via Iran’s Fars News Agency that the Strait of Hormuz was “under the complete control of the Islamic Republic’s Navy” and that any vessel attempting transit without authorisation faced immediate risk from missiles, drones, and targeted military action. The statement came after days of active strikes: more than ten oil tankers had been targeted, and tanker traffic had plummeted by over 90 per cent from a daily average of approximately 138 transits to three or four on the most restricted days.
The mechanism by which the IRGC is enforcing its de facto blockade does not require a formal legal declaration. Within hours of Operation Epic Fury beginning on February 28, IRGC forces broadcast a VHF radio message to every vessel in the area: no ship was permitted to pass. The message carried the weight of the attacks that preceded it — three tankers struck near the strait in the first 48 hours, including one set ablaze off Oman’s northern coast, and AIS jamming clusters identified across Emirati, Qatari, Omani, and Iranian waters. Ships anchored outside the strait or diverted entirely. Protection and indemnity insurance was withdrawn from March 5, making the economic risk prohibitive for most commercial operators regardless of any security guarantees.
The legal position, as an EU official confirmed to Reuters, is that Iran has not formally closed the strait — a distinction that matters under UNCLOS, which guarantees transit passage rights through international waterways, but which the insurance market and the shipping industry have decided is irrelevant to operational reality.
On March 5, the IRGC announced a refinement to its position: the strait would remain closed only to ships from the United States, Israel, and their Western allies, a formulation confirmed again on March 8. The practical effect is that vessels from countries not aligned with the US-Israeli operation — including those with ties to China, Russia, and other non-Western states — may transit with reduced risk, though the safety guarantee is the IRGC’s alone and no commercial insurer has modified its withdrawal accordingly.
The Scale of the Disruption
Clarksons Research, which tracks global shipping data, estimates that approximately 3,200 ships — representing around 4 per cent of global ship tonnage — are currently idle in the Gulf. Of those, approximately 1,230 are vessels that operate only within the Gulf and would not normally transit the strait. An additional 500 ships, representing 1 per cent of global tonnage, are waiting outside the Gulf in ports off the UAE and Oman coast, unable to proceed in either direction. Container-mag
The combined pipeline bypass capacity available to Gulf producers — Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline and the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline — covers approximately 2.6 million barrels per day, a fraction of the 20 million that normally transit Hormuz. Iraq, Kuwait, and Qatar have no comparable alternatives. Even in the most optimistic scenario, two-thirds of current Gulf crude exports remain physically dependent on the strait. The military dimension — mines, drone warfare, electronic jamming, and IRGC speedboat capability — creates a risk environment that commercial operators cannot safely ignore regardless of what any diplomatic progress might eventually produce.
The one verified transit since the effective closure offers a window into how vessels are attempting to navigate the situation. A tanker named Pola switched off its AIS tracker as it approached the strait, reappearing off Abu Dhabi the following day. The vessel apparently completed the passage — but did so by turning off its transponder, removing itself from the maritime tracking record, and accepting the risk that comes with operating without any public position signal in waters where the IRGC has stated it will attack unverified vessels. CBT News
The Regional Spread of the Conflict
The research brief’s claims about air raid sirens in Dubai and Bahrain on March 10 are not independently confirmed in primary sources reviewed. What is confirmed is the preceding week’s pattern of Iranian strikes reaching Gulf state infrastructure. Iranian missile and drone barrages struck Israeli cities, US military bases across the Gulf, and critical infrastructure in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait in the days following the initial Operation Epic Fury strikes on February 28. The US-flagged Stena Imperative was struck twice at the port of Bahrain, causing a fire and killing one port worker. Automotive Manufacturing Solutions
Trump has threatened to hit Iran “twenty times harder” if they stop the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz, and subsequently posted on Truth Social: “Death, Fire, and Fury will reign upon them.” He has also said on Truth Social that the US Navy will begin escorting tankers through the strait “as soon as possible.” The IRGC’s position is that Iran — not the United States — will determine when and how the conflict ends. The gap between those two positions has not narrowed in the ten days since the first strikes. CNBC
The Structural Reality No Market Can Easily Price
Iran does not need to win a fleet engagement against the United States Navy. It needs only to make passage too costly for commercial operators to accept. With drone swarms, anti-ship missiles, and layered coastal defences, the IRGC can sustain a de facto blockade without directly engaging US warships. The insurance market’s withdrawal of war-risk coverage — which preceded any formal blockade declaration — has already done much of the IRGC’s work for it. No algorithm can reroute tankers around drone swarms. No amount of market liquidity replaces a barrel that never leaves port. CNBC
The oil price on Tuesday morning, trading in the $88 to $91 range after Monday’s intraday peak of $119, reflects a market that is pricing temporary diplomatic optimism against a physical blockade that has not moved. The IRGC’s position has been stated clearly, consistently, and has been enforced against real vessels carrying real crews. Until the strait opens — in fact, not in political messaging — the gap between the price and the risk has not closed.
All IRGC statements are sourced from Iran’s state media via Times of Israel, ABC7 Chicago (AP pool), and PingTV India citing Fars News Agency. Shipping disruption statistics are sourced from Clarksons Research via Al Jazeera and the 2026 Strait of Hormuz Crisis Wikipedia entry, which aggregates AP, Reuters, and maritime intelligence sources. The Atlas Institute for International Affairs analysis draws on publicly available academic and institutional sources. US CENTCOM statements are attributed to Fox News reporting cited in Times of Israel. Claims in the research brief about Dubai airport protocols and Harir base strikes on March 10 could not be independently verified from primary sources at time of publication and have been excluded pending confirmation. This article covers an active and rapidly developing conflict situation; all details are subject to change.
